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SHOULD USURY STATUTES BE USED TO SOLVE THE
INSTALMENT SALES "PROBLEM"?
The question of whether public policy requires the application of usury
statutes to instalment sales contracts has arisen once again in the aftermath
of a series of Nebraska decisions in which the court so applied Nebraska's
usury statute.'
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the public policy considera-
tions behind such reasoning and to determine whether such decisions should
be followed. 2 Its aim is to assist the reader in understanding the instalment
sales "problem," and to discuss the possible solutions together with the
difficulties presented by the solutions.
In the United States "usury" has two distinct definitions: the legal and
the non-legal. The legal is "the reserving and taking or contracting to reserve
and take . . . a greater sum for the use of money than the lawful interest
rate." Its non-legal meaning is "an exorbitant amount or rate of interest."'
An analysis of the two meanings reveals that their difference lies in their
emphasis. The legal approach stresses a passing of a statutory limit. The
layman's stress is the surpassing of the limit of reasonableness. In essence,
though both meanings refer to the same term, they define two essentially
different concepts—moral usury and legal usury.
By use of a hypothetical case, the viewpoints of the "majority" and the
"minority" jurisdictions on this issue will be set forth.
Buyer, interested in purchasing a refrigerator, asks Retailer the price.
Upon being informed that its cash price is $600, Buyer expresses a willing-
ness to purchase the product and he tells Retailer that he would like to
finance it over a twelve month period. Retailer, after consulting a chart
furnished by Finance, tells Buyer that the time-price will be $53 a month for
twelve months. Buyer agrees and signs a contract containing the following
information• cash price ($600); time-price ($636); time differential ($36);
payment period (12 mos.); monthly payments ($53). Several days later,
Retailer discounts the contract to Finance, a company which normally buys
"commercial paper" (usually called "chattel paper" in these cases). Several
1 For a report of the Nebraska situation see Wall St. Journal, Oct. 23, 1963,
p. 1, col. 4 (eastern ed.), and "Caveat Venditor," Time Magazine, Nov. 8, 1963, p. 76.
For a review of the previous Nebraska situation see Comment, An Analysis of Nebraska
Finance Law, 40 Neb. L. Rev. 433 (1961).
2 This article is not concerned with whether or not instalment sales are now
subject to the prohibition of usury statutes, but rather, as a matter of public policy,
whether they should be. For articles dealing with the latter problem see: Note, Usury
in Credit Sales, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1143 (1958); criticized in Ralf el, Conditional Sales
Contracts and Usury Laws, 76 Banking L.J. 829 (1959); Comment, Finance Charges
or Time-Price Differential in Installment Sales—Usury?, 24 Mo. L. Rev. 225 (1959) ;
Symposium—Instalment Selling, 2 Law and Contemn. Prob. 139 (1935) ; Warren,
Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 Yale L.J. 839 (1959);
Symposium—Developments in Consumer Credit Law, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 301 (1960).
For an article on the English view, see Note, Hire-Purchase or Moneylending?, 25
Modern L. Rev. 590 (1962).
3 Black, Law Dictionary 1714 (4th ed. 1951).
4 American College Dictionary 1338 (1954).
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months pass, and Buyer has not made any monthly payments. Finance
brings an action for the payments. Buyer answers that the contract is
usurious as the maximum rate of interest permitted by statute is nine per
cent and the contract in question bears a twelve per cent effective rate of
interest (i.e., true interest) and is therefore unlawful.
The holding of the court depends upon the jurisdiction. A court ad-
hering to the "majority" view would HOLD: (1) usury applies only to a
loan of money or a forebearance of a debt; (2) an instalment sale does not
involve a loan of money or forebearance of a debt; (3) a finance company
can enforce a contract although the credit price exceeds the cash price by
more than the lawful interest rate."
However, a "minority" jurisdiction would HOLD: (1) the time differ-
ential, the difference between the time-price and the cash price, is a charge
for the forebearance to collect the full cash price and is therefore interest;
(2) interest, even in,
 an instalment sales contract as the time differential, must
not exceed the lawful rate; (3) a finance company is barred from enforcing
a time sales contract which was usurious at its inception."
In attempting to reconcile the divergent views and to solve the prob-
lems presented by the hypothetical case, several subsidiary questions should
be, considered: (I) What is the public policy supporting the adoption of
laws regulating the rate or amount of interest that may be charged, for the
loan or use of money (usury statutes)? (2) Historically, what has been
the rationale of usury statutes, and what has been the effect of such laws?
(3) Should a distinction be made between loans for business use and those
for consumer or individual needs? (4) Is the differential between the cash
price of a commodity or service and the time or credit price to be considered
in the same category as "interest for the use of money" and thus be sub-
ject to regulation?
	 . .
For a proper analysis of the issues presented, the history of usury must
be considered. Usury has had a long and erratic career. What follows will
be the events that have had the greatest impact on our present day law
and judicial theory.
Interest7
 was prohibited by the major cultures and religions of antiq-
uity." Both Athens" and Rome"' had no official pronouncement against in-
5 E.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39 (1926);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 423 (1924);
Nazarian v. Lincoln Fin. Corp., 77 R.I. 497, 78 A.2d 7 (1951).
6 Elder v. Doerr, — Neb. —, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963); G.M.A.C. v. Mackrill, —
Neb. —, 122 N.W.2d 743 (1963) ; Stanton v. Mattson, — Neb. —, 123 N.W.2d 844
(1963); Lloyd v. Gutgsell, — Neb. —, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963).
7 The term "usury" as used in ancient times was synonymous with interest.
8 Interest was prohibited by Hindu and Chinese law, and by the Koran. Durnham
V. Gould, 16 N.Y. (Johns.) 367 (1819). This decision by Chancellor Kent contains
an excellent discussion of the historical aspects of usury. Likewise, Mosaic law pro-
hibited the taking of interest on a loan of money. Exodus XVIII, 25; Leviticus XXV,
35-37; Deuteronomy XXIII, 19-20; Psalms XV, 5.
9 In Athens at 400 B.C. usage recognized interest rates on personal loans between
10 and 33%. Loans for commercial and maritime purposes had a higher rate. Neifeld,
Personal Finance Business 19 (1933).
1 ° Rome also had a "usage rate" for personal loans. Montesquieu reports that in
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terest; it was regulated by usage. Later, due to the popular unrest of the
debtor class, the Twelve Tables reduced interest on personal loans to one
percent," and eventually Rome outlawed interest altogether." The effect of
this law was to encourage the lending of money at exorbitant rates, as the
taking of any interest was an illegal activity." To put an end to this wide-
spread usury, the emperors were forced to legalize the charging of interest.
Rome's experience with usury ran the gamut from no controls on interest
to no interest." Neither extreme was successful.15
With the advent of Christianity, the problem of usury was still un-
solved. Some conclusions, though, can be drawn; (1) loans to an individual
in need had to be either interest free or at a low rate; (2) loans for com-
mercial purposes could bear a high rate of interest; and (3) Aristotle's
theory" of the barrenness of money was to be the foundation of scholastic
opposition to interest.
The Christian attitude towards interest did not differ radically from
the position of the older religions—the charging of interest was wrong."
The rationale behind the Church's stand was based on a variety of theories.
One was a revival of the Aristotelian doctrine with a slight twist: "Money
is barren because it has no value at all and can serve only as a medium of
exchange."" Another theory was that payment for the use of money is
payment for time which, while being common property, belongs only to
Cicero's day the "usage rate" was 34%. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws ch. 22
§ 21 (1748).
11 But see ibid.: "Tacitus says that the law of the Twelve Tables fixed the interest
at 1%. It is evident he was mistaken . . . [since] a law like this could not be the
work of the Decemvirs."
12 This was due to the fact that the extortion by creditors and the resistance of
debtors was constantly disturbing the public peace. Durnham v. Gould, supra note 8.
Now, "when a man wanted to borrow he found an obstacle in the very law made in
his favor." Montesquieu, op. cit. supra note 10, ch. 22 § 22.
13 Especially at election time: "[the] best way to . . . [prevent corruption of
suffrage] was to discourage the lending upon interest . . . for usury always increased
at time of elections because they [candidates] stood in need to bribe the voters." Ibid.
14 Prompting Montesquieu's often quoted statements: "Law[s] excessively good
are the source of excessive evil." And, "mankind are [sic] governed not by extremes
but by principles of moderation." Id. at ch. 22, §§ 21, 22.
15 In addition to giving us a warning of the dangers of extremism in legislation,
Rome gave us another legacy—the loan bank, the nearest modern counterpart being
the Hebrew Free Loan Society. Neifeld, op. cit. supra note 9, at 15.
103 As money cannot breed money, as plants and animals can, interest charges are
contrary to the laws of nature. Consumer Credit and Its Uses 5 (Hardy ed. 1938).
17 Five events are significant in the development of the Christian viewpoint:
305 AD.—Council of Elvira—interest taking is prohibited by clerics; 345 A.D.-
Council of Carthage—interest taking by laymen is reprehensible; 789 A.D.—Council
of Aix—taking interest is punishable by the bishops; 1179 A.D.—Third Lateran Coun-
cil—those guilty of usury would be excommunicated; 1311 AD.—Council of Vienna—
civil law permitting usury is void as it would be contrary to Church Canon Law.
Robinson and Nugent, Regulation of Small Loan Business 23 (Russell Sage Foundation
1935). For a chart of the "Attitude of Ecclesiastical Authorities towards Interest and
Usury" from 1300 B.C. to 1873 A.D. see Neifeld, op. cit. supra note 9, at 23-25.
18 Neifeld, op. cit. supra note 9, at 329.
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God.19 Others objected to the fact that money earned interest on Sunday
and thought it similar to "plowing on Sunday." 22
By 1311, loans with interest were absolutely forbidden by the Catholic
Church with two results: (1) the needy borrower had no one to go to for
money except the illegal lender who charged exorbitant rates; and (2)
money lending for commercial purposes was now developing in the hands
of non-Christians.2 ' To remedy the first situation, charitable loan associa-
tions were established which were operated interest free. As a result of their
failure to charge interest, most of these associations were short-lived. The
first lending institutions of this type to achieve permanence were organized
by the Franciscans in Italy in 1462—Monti di Pieta. 22 Later, to survive,
they had to charge interest." Due to ecclesiastical opposition, they had a
slow growth in France after flourishing in Italy. 24
The development of commerce had the same effect upon the theory of
usury in Medieval Europe as previously had taken place in Rome. Rome
attempted to abolish usury but the development of trade made loans with
interest a necessary part of life. A further impetus leading to the legalizing
of interest in Rome was the adverse effect the abolition of interest had on
the needy borrower. So too in Italy, the revival and development of com-
merce made the doctrine of usury, then prevalent, outmoded. 25 Thus, the
rebirth of commerce aided in the development of commercial loans and
fostered the birth and growth of banking institutions." Unlike Rome, the
relaxation of restraints on the levying of interest was applicable only to
commercial loans. It is important to note that during this period the only
19 Hardy, op. cit. supra note 16, at 6.
29 Sir Francis Bacon for example. Id. at 7. Though Chancellor Kent's quotation
from Bacon v. Gould, supra note 8, demonstrates that Bacon realized that the two
extremes had to be rectified so that the "tooth of usury" would be ground without
extinguishing capital investment for the advancement of trade.
21 Another result of the Church's stand was the development of the term for
years, a nonfreehold estate. "The term for years was used in the thirteenth century
principally as a moneylending device designed to evade the Church's prohibition of
usury." Moynihan, Intro. to Real Property 63 (1962).
22 Also called Montes Pietates. Though established by the Franciscans, they were
run by the municipalities. The borrower pledged personal property and he was charged
no interest.
23 This caused a furor, particularly by the Dominicans. Robinson and Nugent,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 23-24. This dispute was solved by the Lateran Council of
1515, which decreed that Monti di Pietta which charged interest were not sinful but
meritorious and they were allowed to exact a small interest charge. Neifeld, op, cit.
supra note 9, at 25.
24 The worth of such organizations was finally recognized and they were reopened
by Royal Decree in 1777. This was the foundation of the State Pawnshops of France
after which the Provident Loan Society of New York, a semi-philanthropic organiza-
tion, was modeled. Hardy, op. cit. supra note 16, at 18.
26 "The North Italians, who were the first great Christian merchants, were also
the first great Christian moneylenders . . . whom kings and princes looked to for
financial aid." Id. at 7.
26 Bank of Venice (1157), Bank Barcelona (1401), Casa di San Georgio (Genoa
—1408), Banco di Rialto (Venice-1587), Banco di Sant' Ambrogio (Milan-1593).
Neifeld, op. cit. supra note 9, at 15. See also the chart, "Important Dates in History of
Banking," Id. at 17.
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institution which attempted to meet the needs of the deserving small bor-
rower was the charitable Monti di Pieta.
The English view of usury, up to the reign of Henry VIII, was similar
to the view held in Continental Europe and the penalties for usurious loans
were severe." In 1545, the right to lend money up to ten per cent was
recognized by statute." This was a radical and significant departure from
history, as no government since Rome had passed a law permitting interest
charges on a personal loan.
Now, England, as Rome before it, in search of a solution for the
interest problem, ran the gamut from no interest laws (1555) 29 to laws
regulating the interest rates (1571),80 and back again to no interest regula-
tions by statute (1854). 3 ' The philosophical implications of interest can-
not be divorced from the commercial. Hence, the development of the English
theory of usury after 1854 cannot be fully understood unless the philosoph-
ical considerations of the subject are borne in mind. Throughout history,
interest was not only a social problem but also an ethical and moral one.
The Aristotelian theory still has its influence today. Hilaire Belloc expresses
it as:
Men had everywhere begun to think' as though money were part
of the nature of things as though money had, indeed, merely as
money, a right to breed. 32
The Belloc quotation, as representative of one school of modern thought,
echoes the theory, expressed centuries ago by Aristotle, that the charging of
interest violates natural law due to money's barrenness.
At this point in England there were no statutory limitations on the
interest rate. England found that this was no solution to the problem,
but rather created a greater social evil. In seeking a solution to this problem,
England slowly came upon the realization of the distinction between moral
and legal usury." After 1854, Chancery Courts were petitioned by debtors
for aid against oppressive contracts. It was in equity that moral usury was
27 The usurer was liable to the penalties of the Church and after his death his
chattels were forfeited to the king and his lands escheated to the lord of the fee. Gray
v. Bennett, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 522, 527 (1842).
28 37 Hen. VIII ch. 9. The language of the statute demonstrates a recognition of
the fact that the total prohibition of interest encouraged usury. This marked the
passing in England of the clerical influence on the state's attitude towards the recogni-
tion of loans with interest. Neifeld, Personal Finance Comes of Age 8 (1939).
29 5 & 6 Edw. VI ch. 20 [1555].
30 13 Eliz. ch. 8. [1571].
31 17 & 18 Vict. ch. 90 [1854]. Yet, it should be noted that this development had
a profound effect on the status of interest. Prior to 1545, the absence of usury statutes
meant that interest could not be charged; whereas, after 1854, the absence of usury
statutes meant that interest could be charged.
32 Belloc, Crisis of Civilization 148 (1937) (Emphasis in original).
83 "Moral usury" may be defined as: "The taking of interest upon a loan of
money alone . . . whether the money be invested soundly or not, whether it represents
productive energy or not." Id. at 143. See also Neifeld, op. cit. supra note 9, at 331.
The taking of profit on an unproductive loan is moral usury because it "destroys the
debtor by putting him under the tribute to pay, though he has no source of income
produced by the sum he borrowed." Belloc, op. cit. supra note 32, at 147.
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first used as a "yardstick" by the courts in their decisions. 84. The legislative
body finally recognized the distinction in 1900 and made moral usury a legis-
lative mandate in the English Money-Lenders Act. 35 The Act provided that if
the court found that the interest rate was excessive, the court could remake
the contract and the debtor was relieved from paying the sum in excess of
the sum judicially determined to be fair. 86
Germany, too, at this point in history, came upon the recognition of
moral usury. There, if the profit, from a loan of money seemed out of
proportion to the services rendered, the loan transaction was null and void.
This approach seems more desirable than the English for two reasons. First
of all, the usurer forfeits his loan which has a deterrent effect on the exacting
of usury. Also, German courts are not burdened with remaking the contract."
The approach to usury in America at the time that the colonies were
established reflected the trend then prevalent in England. It was an historical
"accident" that the six per cent interest rate was adopted in England in
166038
 and was consequently followed in most of the colonies (though some did
experiment with other rates). But, when the English further developed
their views on usury, there were no longer legal ties with the American
colonies. Thus, our approach to usury was peculiar to America. This was
unfortunate, for the states seem to have forgotten the historical implications
related to usury. They have experimented with the fixing of different rates
of interest, apparently holding to the theory that mathematics is the answer
to a moral and social problem."
With mathematics as their guide, the legislators ignored the needs of
the small borrower and unrealisticly clung to the colonial six per cent maxi-
mum rate of interest. Consequently, since small personal loans were un-
profitable at such a low rate, the rapid growth of the banking industry in
America made no provision for the , credit needs of the small borrower"—
34 Neifeld, op. cit. supra note 9, at 332.
115
 63 & 64 Vict. ch. 51.
80
 This act was amended in 1927 to the effect that any interest rate above 48%
is presumed to be excessive (i.e., moral usury), and the burden of proving the contrary
is on the creditor. 17 & 18 Geo. V di. 21 [1927]. In France, moral usury is presumed
when "an effective rate exceeding by more than half the average customary rate in
the same conditions by good faith lenders for credit transactions carrying the same
risks as the loan involved" is reached. Symposium—Developments in the Consumer
Credit Law, supra note 2, at 304.
87
 Both approaches, however, recognize the fact that a speculative commercial
loan may bear a high rate of interest. Belloc also agrees that a productive loan (one
that is to be used to produce more money) can bear a high rate of interest-1000%
or even higher. He goes even further, though, and holds the opinion that a personal
loan, which is a non-productive one, cannot bear interest. Belloc, op. cit. supra note
32, at 145.
88
 It should be noted that by 1660, 7 out of the 13 original colonies were then in
existence. England's rate was still in a state of flux: 1624-8%; 1660-6%; 1714-5%.
39 
"The American legislator has never been able to divorce himself from the con-
ception of a mathematical limit that effortlessly separates the good from the bad. Like
the Dantean inferno, he would have his usury statute—even when modified to meet
modern conditions—herald to the world the exact numerical line that marked the
complete abandonment of social desirability." Neifeld, op. cit. supra note 9, at 334.
40 Ibid.
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needs which did not arise out of business transactions, but which arose out
of illness, unemployment, and the like. The enactment of small loan acts,
which permitted a higher rate of interest on small loans than previously pro-
vided for before by statute, was an attempt to meet the needs of the small
borrower.
This development was a significant breakthrough as it was the first
time a distinction was made in America between the lending of small and
large loans. Up to this point, the laws failed to take into consideration the
high proportionate expense and risk involved in non-commercial small
loans."
The credit needs of the small borrower became an ever-increasing social
problem. This need was attempted to be met by the encouragement of philan-
thropic" and semi-philanthropic organizations. The Morris Plan was also
developed to help the small borrower obtain loans by permitting the creditor
to avoid the low interest rates which made such loans financially unprofit-
able. Credit unions were also established to aid the small borrower. 43 The
worth of such organizations is manifested by their present day growth.
It must now be apparent to the reader that the age-old problem, the
same problem which faced Rome, now confronted America. The usury laws
which historically were passed to protect the debtor had the adverse effect.
Interest was regulated at a rate that made the loan business unprofitable,
an obstacle to the debtor arising out of the very laws made for his benefit.
It is important to bear in mind the policy behind usury statutes. Such
statutes were designed to protect the borrower from unscrupulous persons
seeking to take advantage of his needy condition.
The basis for these laws was really moral usury. Since the needy bor-
rower had lost his bargaining power, the state had to restore it to him.
Thus, these statutes afforded him protection not provided by contract law.
They were not an attempt to discourage loans, nor were they an attempt
to discourage profit. They were merely a legislative attempt to provide the
needy debtor protection at a time when he could not protect himself. Con-
sequently, the first step toward a realistic approach to usury was the
recognition that corporations could not use usury as a defense." A corpora-
tion borrowed money to produce more. The corporation never faced the
situation where a lack of money meant death or hunger. The lack of money
may have meant financial death, but that was not considered a moral prob-
lem. Usury statutes were enacted to prevent a moral evil. It can also be
stated as a truism that where interest rates are too low, licensed money-
41 Hubachek, Annotations on Small Loan Laws 1 (Russell Sage Foundation
1938).
42 One of the first such organizations in America was the Franklin Loan Fund
established by Benjamin Franklin in a codicil to his will. The fund did not grow as he
had anticipated and the courts were called upon to vary the terms of the trust. Robin-
son and Nugent, op. cit. supra note 17, at 77.
43 A credit union is a cooperative association, the members of which pool their
savings and from the pool make loans to themselves. E. A, Filene, a Boston merchant,
spent a great deal of money in their promotion and was the impetus behind credit
union legislation in the various states, Hardy, op. cit. supra note 16, at 37.
44 Neifeld, op. cit. supra note 9, at 279.
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lenders will withdraw, leaving the needy borrower in the hands of loan
sharks. Too low a rate will not attract capital. The legislators must guard
against unwillingly creating such a condition in their attempts to aid the
debtor.
At the time in America when the legislatures' awareness of the problems
connected with usury statutes was increasing, instalment sales began to be
used in retail sales. Isaac Singer in 1856, in order to increase the sales of his
sewing machine, was the first to offer retail instalment contracts on a mass
scale.45 The theory behind instalment sales is that it enables the consumer-
borrower to enjoy an income (through purchasing power) before earning it."
The buyer pays for an article while he uses it, rather than paying for it in
advance. Thus, instalment sales and usury statutes developed together in
America. It was only natural, then, that there should be a conflict between
the two. If the difference between the cash price and time-sale price (i.e.,
the "time differential") could be judicially determined to be interest, and
this time differential were higher than the lawful interest rate, it would be
a usurious contract. The courts did not adopt this view for a variety of
reasons. The prevailing view was that usury applied only to a "loan or fore-
bearance of a debt" and was not applicable to an instalment sales contract. 47
If we consider the historical problems created by usury and the reason for
usury statutes, the reluctance of the courts to apply usury to instalment
sales is well founded.
The purchaser, unlike the needy debtor who requires money to meet
an emergency and because of this cannot bargain, generally can refrain
from buying." If the time price is oppressive or exorbitant, the usual pur-
chaser is not compelled to buy. On the other hand, the needy borrower is
in no position to shop around. Usury statutes must protect the needy bor-
rower, but must they protect the purchaser in his voluntary act of buying?
It is easy to see, that if usury statutes are to be applied to instalment sales,
the rationale or public policy motives behind such a step differs from the
application of usury to a hire of money.
The problem this article has attempted to define is: "Should usury be
applied to instalment sales? If so, how?" An attempt to answer these ques-
tions can only be made after we have answered another question: "What
45 Though not used widely till 1856, the use of instalment sales was an old idea.
Crassus, a contemporary of Julius Caesar, is reported to have made a fortune building
houses outside of Rome and selling them on the instalment plan. Hardy, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 58. The first to use instalment sales in the United States was Cowperwaite
and Sons, furniture dealers in New York in 1807. Federal Reserve System Board of
Governors, Consumer Instalment Credit pt. II, vol. 1, at 173 (1957). This report con-
sists of four parts: Part I. Consumer Instalment Credit, Growth and Import (2 vols.);
Part II. Conference on Regulation (2 vols.); Part III. Views on Regulation; Part IV.
Financing New Car Purchases (hereinafter cited as Federal Reserve System).
40 Hardy, op. cit. supra note 16, at 3.
47 First considered by the Supreme Court in Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (I Black)
115 (1861). For a compilation of cases supporting this view see Annot. 48 A.L.R.
1142 (1927), supplemented in 57 A.L.R. 880 (1939) and 143 A.L.R. 238 (1943).
48 E.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, supra note 5; Nazarian
v. Lincoln Fin. Corp., supra note 5.
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evil (or evils) do instalment sales present that must be prevented?" Only
when we know what we are trying to prevent can we effectively legislate.
Applying usury statutes to time sales would only prevent unlawful in-
terest. If this is the evil that time sales present, then such a course may be
wise. But, if time sales present other evils, applying usury statutes may be
a "cure worse than the disease." Before we legislate, what is our aim?
Several possible evils of time sales appear to be present: (1) Credit sales
themselves; (2) Large consumer debt; (3) Possibility of fraud; (4) Ex-
cessive time differential.
If time sales are in themselves an evil that must be prevented, then
the abolition of credit sales would be the answer. That is, all consumer
goods would be cash and carry, and the retailers would be out of the credit
business. The net result of this would be a lowering of the retail price as
the stores would not have to make provision in their cash price for bad
debts, and their bookkeeping departments' expenses could be considerably
reduced.' 9 But this is a somewhat "Utopian" approach. The consumer him-
self wants charge accounts. The consumer feels that if he charges his pur-
chase he can more readily return the goods charged than if he had paid
cash. The retailers, too, would object to this since: (1) credit customers
are less likely to shop around for loss leaders and other bargains; (2) cash
customers bunch their purchases at pay day causing peak-loads while credit
customers buy evenly; and (3) credit customers' names and addresses are
known and can be reached by retailers by mail advertising 5 0 The greatest
objection retail merchants would have to strictly cash sales, however, would
be that they would not have the personal contact with their cash customers
that they now enjoy with their credit customers. Yet, if credit sales in them-
selves are the evil contrary to public policy, strictly cash sales may be the
answer.
In considering the abolition of credit sales, the legislatures would
have to carefully consider the advantages which time-buying possesses as
opposed to its evils. A great advantage is that it permits low-income couples
to have a greater opportunity to marry earlier, raise families while they are
young and to enjoy many of the benefits which the upper-income couples
do G 1
On the other hand, the evil may not be credit sales entirely, but only
the volume to which they have grown. In 1960, there was a $56 billion
consumer debt of which instalment sales constituted eighty per cent." If
this is the problem, the solution would be to regulate instalment sales. Great
legal, social, political and economic problems are presented, however, when-
ever the government attempts to regulate our economy. If our public policy
is to prevent people from becoming greatly in debt, controlling interest is
not the answer. Our increased consumer debt is the result of several factors:
42 It may also have the effect of raising the cost of hiring money (interest) as
loan companies would then have to provide for "bad debts" previously carried by
credit retailers.
50 Hardy, op. cit. supra note 16, at 57.
51 Black, Buy Now Pay Later 212 (1961).
52 Id. at 111.
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(1) decay of the thrift pattern; (2) respectability of debt; and (3) gen-
eral collapse of inhibitions against borrowing." To meet this problem, the
solution may be a revival of "Regulation W" which controlled consumer
credit during wartime." This was accomplished by specifying the minimum
down payment allowed and the maximum periods for repayment. Both
sellers of consumer goods and lenders of money were subject to the regula-
tion.55 This was considered, right after the Korean War, as a possible in-
strument of central banking policy in peacetime. But the permanent status
of the regulation of consumer credit was not favorably received." The
greatest objection to such a solution is that it will not work. 57
If we assume that the state cannot protect the consumer from falling
into debt, and should not, it would seem that full disclosure to prevent
fraud is all that the state can do. To appreciate the problem of the consumer,
it must be remembered that there are many ways of computing the amount
due to the creditor even though the principal and the rate of interest are
the same." To prevent this confusion, it has been suggested that the effective
rate of interest (i.e., the true annual rate) should be disclosed." The primary
concern of the government should be full disclosure so that the consumer
will not be deceived. The principle of full disclosure is not new and is the
basis for the regulation of the public offering of securities pursuant to the
Securities Act of 1933.°° If we are so strict in requiring full disclosure in
the buying of securities, an area where, for the most part; we are dealing with
sophisticated investors, why a lesser standard for the consumer?
Two serious objections arise to this proposal. The first is that it may
be of no assistance to the consumer. In most states, the retailer in an instal-
ment sales contract is already required to disclose the time-differential
53 Hardy, op. cit. supra note 16, at 129.
54 For a synopsis of reasons for and against government controls see Federal
Reserve System, op. cit. supra note 45, at pt. III, 5, 6.
55
 The cash lenders had to determine the purposes for which the proceeds of the
loan were to be used.
56 Federal Reserve System, op. cit. supra note 45, at pt. II, vol. 1, XVII-XIX.
57 "Consumer credit controls will not force consumers to save. Actually, consumer
credit channels the use of consumer income from frivolous spending to expenditures
for desirable goods. The consumer has something to show for his spending. Through
credit the consumer does save. Result of consumer credit control would be for govern-
ment to tell consumers how they can spend their money. This is a fundamental de-
parture from the philosophy of free consumer choice." Id. at 165.
68
 For charts showing the different methods of computation possible and the
different amounts due because of this see, Neifeld, op. cit. supra note 28, at 171-175.
59
 Model Retail Instalment Sales Act, 3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 443, 444
(1962) recommends that this be followed and contains a formula for its computation.
This view is also supported in Black, op. cit. supra note 51, at 89, 219. For a view that
some legislation in this field has been defective see Willies, Protection Instalment
Buyers Didn't Get, 2 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 287 (1962).
60 "Full disclosure" for the benefit of the consumer is also the basis of the Auto-
mobile Information Disclosure Act which requires that the manufacturer affix a label
to the windshield of the car containing: make, model, serial number, assembly point,
name and address of retail dealer, method and place of delivery, suggested retail price
of auto and accessories and transportation charges. Symposium—Developments in the
Consumer Credit Law, supra note 2, at 403.
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(time price minus cash price). It does not seem that expressing the time-
differential in percentages will be of much assistance. Conceivably, it will
just confuse the consumer by the addition of more numbers to the contract. 61
If the consumer knows he is paying X number of dollars over the cash
price by buying it on time, would it help to inform the consumer that the
X number of dollars represents Y percentage of the time-price or Z percent-
age of annual interest? The second objection is an administrative one. In
many situations, it is almost impossible at the inception of the instalment
contract to determine what the simple interest will be.° 2 In any event, it
should be remembered that the only evil full disclosure will help to prevent
is fraud.
The final possible "evil" of instalment sales is excessive time-differential.
That is, the consumer is paying too much for the privilege of buying goods
on time. The problem presented is: "Does public policy require that the
consumer be protected from paying too much for goods on time?" Those
who felt that public policy required such a move, enacted legislation
in the nature of usury laws expressly placing a limit upon the amount of
finance or similar charges that may be made—Instalment Sales Acts.63 The
purpose of such legislation was twofold: (1) to restrict the amount of the
time-differential, and (2) to require that all pertinent information be in-
cluded in the contract so that the buyer would really have a choice between
the cash and time price.
In light of the Nebraska decisions and the limited amount of authority
supporting this view, the question limits itself to: "In view of the historical
need for usury statutes and the philosophical implications related to usury,
should the courts now adopt the view that public policy requires the appli-
cation of usuary statutes to instalment sales contracts?"
The first objection to such a move is that if public policy requires that
it be done (taking into consideration the previous discussion), it should be
left to the legislature to do it. The courts should be reluctant to outlaw
long established usage The result of the courts' invalidating all existing in-
stalment sales contracts would be financial havoc. 64 But, in spite of this,
61 This conclusion can be drawn from the results of a survey reported in Black,
op. cit. supra note 51, at 135. The author, a critic of the "buy now, pay later" craze,
relates that the interviewer found that the interviewed consumers knew that they were
paying more for time sales than the cash price. Yet, the interviewed consumers did
not know how much more in percentages. Some did not even know what the term
"true interest" meant. In spite of this, the author still advocates "full disclosure" and
apparently feels that this will solve most, if not all, of the instalment sales evils. One
would assume that he is also going to educate the average time-consumer so that his
"full disclosure" position will have some meaning.
62 Testimony to this effect was given before the Senate Banking Committee, hold-
ing hearings in Boston under the chairmanship of Sen. Paul Douglas (D.-Ill.), on his
"Truth-in-Lending" bill (S. 750). Boston Record-American Nov. 23, 1963, p. 7, col.
1 ("payoff final" ed.).
63 The first such law was passed in Indiana in 1935, followed by Wisconsin
(1935), Massachusetts (1937), and Maine (1939). A Survey of State Retail Instalment
Sales Legislation, 44 Cornell L.Q. 38 (1958). See also Comment, Retail Installment
Sales—History and Development of Regulation, 45 Marg. L. Rev. 555 (1962).
64 Assuming that the 1960 figures are still applicable (see text accompanying note
399
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
if the court feels that the public policy considerations are so great that
such a move must be followed, the result of such a move could be disastrous
for the consumer and to the economy. The retailer will cease selling goods
by instalment sales contracts (assuming the usury statute would not allow-
a profitable interest rate) and the consumer who is unable to pay cash
will be unable to buy. Thus, while attempting to protect the unwary con-
sumer, the courts could be leaving the consumer to the mercy of the illegal
lenders.
The second objection to such a course is that the rationale behind
usury statutes does not apply to conditional sales. It is somewhat unrealistic
to hold that moral usury considerations apply when the "loan" concerns
consumer goods (and, for the most part, luxury items: automobiles, televi-
sions, etc.). The concept that the needy borrower is in no position to bar-
gain does not apply. Especially since the consumer is generally free to
buy the items on time or not. In essence, if the government is going to regu-
late the time-differential rates via a mathematical formula, it really is en-
gaging in price control. This control could easily be avoided if retailers
sold only on credit, for there would be no time-differential to regulate, and
by definition "time-differential" is the difference between the cash and time
price. If the purchaser paid cash, he would receive credits towards addi-
tional purchases or perhaps extra green stamps. It could also result in the
formation of two types of stores—cash and credit.
These alternatives are mentioned to show that the application of usury
to instalment sales is no permanent answer to the problem. It would only
create many more problems. As the study of the history of usury points
out, this is a moral and ethical, as well as an economic, problem; it cannot
be solved through mathematical manipulations.
Where, then, does the solution lie? The most effective regulator is
competition and not additional legislation. Governments should concentrate
on seeing to it that there is true competition and should enforce aggressively
the laws that prohibit collusion among competitors in fixing prices and
other methods of restraining trade 6a
RONALD W. DEL SESTO
52 supra), the courts would be invalidating 80% of $56 billion. It was for this reason
that the court in Hare v. General Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 SAV.2d 973
(1952), used the device of "prospective over-ruling" via a "caveat." However, this
method still does not justify court interference in a legislative area.
65
 "Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is
declared to be illegal." Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 29 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1958).
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